Another recurring complaint was that the focus on achieving project milestones diverted critical attention from health monitoring from working relationships between public and private entities. A consultant for a US P3 project said: «The partnership is extremely important. Many fail in the sense that people quickly fall into familiar behaviors. They are like people who get married after two dates; They have no way to solve things together. One of the main criticisms of public-private partnerships is the lack of accountability and transparency associated with these projects. Part of the reason why evidence of PPP performance is often unavailable is that most of the financial details of P3s are under the veil of trade secret regulations and are not available to researchers and the public. Around the world, P3 opponents have initiated legal proceedings to access P3 project documentation that is larger than the limited result sheets available on the project`s websites. If they succeed, the documents they receive are often heavily edited.  Not to be confused with lower overall project costs, value for money is a concept used to evaluate P3 bids from private partners against a hypothetical public sector comparator designed to approximate the costs of an all-public option (in terms of design, construction, financing and operation). P3 value-for-money calculations take into account a number of costs, the exact nature of which has changed over time and varies by jurisdiction. One thing that remains consistent, however, is the preference for «risk transfer» to the private partner at the expense of the public sector comparison partner. :Chapter 1 A crucial aspect of many infrastructure P3s is that most of the pre-financing is provided by the private sector.
The way in which this funding is provided varies considerably from country to country. For P3s in the UK, bonds are used rather than bank loans. In Canada, P3 projects typically use loans that must be repaid within 5 years, and projects are refinanced at a later date.  For certain types of public-private partnerships, the costs of using the service are borne exclusively by users of the service, e.B toll road users.  In other types (in particular the PFI), capital investments are made by the private sector on the basis of a contract with the government for the provision of agreed services, and the costs of providing the services are borne in whole or in part by the government.  After a wave of privatization of many water services in the 1990s, particularly in developing countries, experience shows that global water companies have not achieved the promised improvements in water utilities. Instead of lower prices, large volumes of investment and improvements in connecting the poor to water and sanitation, water tariffs have risen, which is beyond the reach of poor households. Multinational water companies are withdrawing from developing countries and the World Bank is reluctant to provide support.  The privatization of the city of Paris` water supply proved undesirable, and at the end of 2009 the city did not renew its contract with two of the French water companies, Suez and Veolia.   After one year of public review, it is anticipated that the water tariff will be reduced from 5% to 10%.  Market-oriented proposals (MLPs) are proposed by the private sector under P3. The MLP policy encourages private sector companies to submit unsolicited proposals for PPP infrastructure projects to the government, rather than requiring the government to propose each project.
In the 2010s, the MLP policy was implemented in most Australian states and territories. :Chapter 5 Amy Sarcevic of Informa Australia notes that «market-oriented proposals have had a relatively high failure rate so far.»  One criticism of P3s for hospitals in Canada is that they lead to an «internal range of authority.» This occurs when the facility is operated and maintained by the private sector, while care services are provided by the public sector. In these cases, nurses cannot ask their fellow cleaners to clean something (urine, blood, etc.) or hang up health and safety signs, even if they stand side by side, without the consent of private managers. :Chapter 4 On the other hand, Allyson Pollock argues that in many PFI projects risks are not actually transferred to the private sector, and based on research by Pollock and others, George Monbiot argues that the calculation of risk in PFI projects is highly subjective and skewed in favor of the private sector: the government agency may retain ownership of the public institution or system, but the private party usually invests its own capital to design and develop the institution or system. As a rule, each partner shares the income that results from the company. Such a project may differ from a typical service contract in that the private sector partner may take a significant stake in the cash amount and the public sector has access to new revenue or service delivery capabilities without having to pay the private sector partner. Sometimes private partners manage to overcome these costs and make a project available to taxpayers at a lower cost. This can be achieved by cutting corners, designing the project to be more cost-effective in the operational phase, charging a user fee, and/or monetizing aspects of projects that are not covered by the contract. For P3 schools in Nova Scotia, the latter included restricting the use of school walls, fields and grass, as well as surveying access to community groups after work at a rate 10 times higher than for non-P3 schools. :Chapter 4 Another model discussed is the public-private-community partnership (PCPP), in which government and private actors work together for social welfare, eliminating the main focus of private actors on profit.
This model is increasingly used in developing countries such as India. [Citation needed] There are many drivers for PPPs. . . . .